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The Confirmation of Punitive
Awards in Arbitration: Did Due
Process Disappear?
Stuart M. Boyarsky*
INTRODUCTION
"Out here, due process is a bullet."'
The issue of punitive damages' reform has recently occupied a
prominent position in our courtrooms and houses of legislation. Even the
United States Supreme Court has lamented that punitive damage awards
have "run wild." 4 While the debate over reforming the permitted size and
amount of punitive awards rages on, 5 the concern over whether such
* J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., Political Science, Queens College of The
City University of New York. Mr. Boyarsky is currently a staff attorney at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton and Garrison LLP. The author would like to thank his wife, Yael, for her ceaseless
encouragement. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
1. THE GREEN BERETS (Warner Brothers 1968).
2. Punitive damages is a monetary award determined after a finding that a defendant has
acted intentionally, maliciously or with a conscious, reckless, willful or wanton disregard for a
plaintiff's interests. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979). Punitive damages
involve a peculiar combination of criminal law's desire for retribution and civil law's compensation
to the injured party which has led some scholars to label punitive damages as being "quasi-criminal."
See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L.
REv. 363, 365-66 (1994) (explaining that the "quasi-criminal" nature of punitive damages "assures
that controversy and debate follow such assessments wherever they may roam, as surely as summer
follows spring.").
3. See, e.g., Marguerite Higgins, Medical Malpractice Award Bill Passes in House, WASH.
TIMES, July 29, 2005, available at http://washingtontimes.coff/business/20050728-100748-
7205r.htm (stating that the House of Representatives recently passed a bill which "limits punitive
damages [for plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases] to no more than twice the amount a plaintiff
would receive for economic damages, which include lost wages and medical bills.").
4. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Mike McKee, Drawing the Line on Punitive Awards, THE RECORDER, Apr. 4,
2005, available at http://media.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/040405-Recorder-
DrawingLinePunitives.pdf ("Defense lawyers. .. argue that arbitrary and unlimited punitive
damages have a chilling effect on state commerce, discourage innovation and increase consumer
229
1
Boyarsky: The Confirmation of Punitive Awards in Arbitration: Did Due Proce
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2006
damages may be awarded outside the courtroom venue has been settled for
nearly a decade.
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court held that when contracting parties agree to include claims for
punitive damages in the scope of issues to be arbitrated, the Federal
Arbitration Act 6 ("FAA") requires that their agreement be enforced.7 This is
true even if state law would bar such a claim from arbitration.8 Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens rejected the argument that the agreement at
issue, which was governed by New York law, incorporated New York's
prohibition of an arbitrator awarding punitive damages, 9 and wrote that "if
contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages within the
issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be
enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise
exclude such claims from arbitration."' 0 Although this decision clearly
allows for the award of punitive damages by an arbitrator, the Court did not
address how the awards should be reviewed." What if an arbitrator imposes
sizeable punitive damages that a party believes to be improper? 12  The
Supreme Court held in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg that a state which does
not provide judicial review of a jury's award of punitive damages violates
costs. Their opponents, including Duke University's Erwin Chemerinsky, argue that large punitive
awards keep companies honest and deter further wrongdoing.").
6. The FAA was enacted in 1925 and signed into law by President Coolidge. Its purpose was
"to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute
resolution that would be speedier and less costly than litigation." O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof'l Planning
Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 745 (11 th Cir. 1988). In order to accomplish this, the Act was designed
"to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate" and to place
such agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts .. " Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd of Trs of
the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (citations omitted).
7. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
8. Id. at 56-64.
9. The court in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976) ruled that under New
York law an arbitrator could not award punitive damages regardless of the fact that the contracting
parties had agreed to allow the arbitrator to do so.
10. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58.
11. See Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1193 (1lth Cir. 1995) (stating that "the
Supreme Court did not discuss the due process issue in Mastrobuono.").
12. Unlike the arbitration situation, the Supreme Court has dealt with whether a trial court's
improper award of excessive punitive damages violates a party's Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights. In BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, (1996), the Court explained that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on
tort-feasors. In that case, the punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff were excessive as
demonstrated by the 500 to 1 ratio between the jury's punitive and actual damage awards, the fairly
insignificant amount of damage, and the lack of statutory fines that remotely parallel the jury
award's level. Id. at 578, 582-85. In addition, the Court held that defendant's due process rights
were also violated because it could not have possibly anticipated, nor did it receive fair notice, that it
might face such a severe punishment. Id. at 574-75, 584.
230
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due process. 3 As the Court in Oberg explained, "[p]unitive damages pose
an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property ....14 While that
opinion dealt solely with a jury award, the question arises whether the
reasoning in Oberg can be applied to punitive damages awarded in
arbitration.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, 5 the lower
courts have consistently rejected the argument that an arbitrator's award of
punitive damages violates the Due Process Clauses 6 of the constitution.'
7
This is due to the fact that constitutional due process" protections restrict
only "the State or ... those acting under color of its authority,"' 9 and does
not extend "to private conduct abridging individual rights" such as
arbitration.20  However, there are exceptions where private conduct must
comply with the Constitution. These exceptions fall into two categories: (1)
the public functions exception: when the action involves a task that has
13. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). The Court in Oberg held that an
amendment to the Oregon Constitution limiting judicial review of the size of punitive damage
awards violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 418. The Court explained that judicial review of
punitive damage awards is one of the few procedural safeguards against the danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property via excessive damage awards. Id. at 416.
14. Id.
15. Interestingly, among the cases recently denied review by the Supreme Court without
comment was EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Stark, challenging on due process grounds an arbitrator's
award and a court's confirmation of punitive damages in a mortgage collection case. EMC
Mortgage Corp. v. Stark, 125 S. Ct. 1973 (2005). The punitive award was 3,000 times higher than
the award of ordinary damages-$6 million compared to $2,000. See Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix &
von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2004).
16. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, provide that neither the United States
nor state governments can deprive an individual "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law... U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991)
(having voluntarily entered into arbitration, "Cunard cannot now argue that its due process was
denied."); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (stating
that "there is ample authority for the proposition that a private arbitration does not implicate due
process concerns ....").
18. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is based on a similar clause in the Magna
Carta (June 15, 1215 A.D.) guaranteeing that
No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his Freehold, or liberties, or
free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon
him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land.
See Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due_process (last visited July 31, 2005).
19. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973).
20. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (quoting Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
231
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traditionally been done exclusively by the government; or (2) the
entanglement exception: when the government affirmatively authorizes,
encourages or facilitates the conduct of a private actor.21  Although these
exceptions seem clear-cut, there has been much confusion as to when they
apply, leading Justice O'Connor to opine that "cases deciding when private
action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of
consistency. 2 2 These cases raise the argument that although arbitration is a
private action, a court's enforcement of an arbitration award transforms the
arbitration into a state action and therefore due process protections should
apply.23 However, as Judge Connor of the Southern District of New York
explained, if the mere approval by a court of an arbitration award created
state action then "all arbitrations could be subject to due process limitations
through the simple act of appealing the arbitrators' decision to the court
system.,
24
Nevertheless, there are opinions which argue that although the
confirmation of an arbitration decision does not require constitutional
protections, the confirmation of an arbitor's award of punitive damages is an
entirely different matter. In fact, the Supreme Court has addressed the
importance of due process limitations in the assessment of punitive damages,
stating that "unlimited jury discretion---or unlimited judicial discretion for
that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results
that jar one's constitutional sensibilities. 25 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, the Court held that the common-law method of assessing
punitive damages did not violate procedural due process.26 In reaching this
decision, the Court stressed that both the trial court and appellate court could
review the jury's award, making "certain that the punitive damages are
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 6.4.1, 6.4.4
(1997).
22. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. See Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
24. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). However, it should be noted that state action may occur and constitutional
protections may apply when a court orders that the party must engage in arbitration, rather than the
party entering into the arbitration voluntarily. See, e.g., Mount St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood,
260 N.E.2d 508, 511 (1970) ("The simple and ineradicable fact is that voluntary arbitration and
compulsory arbitration are fundamentally different if only because one may, under our system,
consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of right, but similar restrictions or deprivations,
if compelled by government, must accord with procedural and substantive due process").
25. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
26. Id. Haslip involved a punitive damages award of approximately $800,000 to a group of
insureds against a life insurance agent who had continued to collect premiums after their policies had
been cancelled. Although the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was approximately four to
one, the Court upheld the award. Id. at 7, 23.
232
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reasonable ... and rational . ,,27 However, this form of appellate review
and due process protection does not exist in arbitration, where the
confirmation of an arbitor's award is almost always a certainty. It can
therefore be argued that by confirming an arbitral award of punitive damages
(and thereby transforming that award into a state action), it is the confirming
court itself that is denying the party's right to due process.
When recently faced with the differing positions on whether
confirmation of punitive awards would constitute state action, the Superior
Court of Connecticut noted that "these divergent views provide interesting
fodder for law review articles and footnotes in judicial opinions ....,,28
Seizing upon the excess of "fodder," this article will attempt to alleviate the
confusion by addressing the conflicting opinions on this topic.
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the reasoning behind
the limited judicial review of an arbitral award. Part II describes the state
action doctrine and explains how several courts have used the doctrine in
order to apply due process protection to proceedings involving private
actors. In particular, this section discusses several significant decisions that
involve the issue of whether a court's confirmation of an arbitrator's award
of punitive damages creates state action and requires the application of
constitutional protections such as due process. This Note concludes that due
to a leading decision by the Eleventh Circuit, it appears that confirmation is
not enough to transform an arbitration award into state action. However, it
is important to note that several courts who have reluctantly followed this
decision have opined that it appears that state action does in fact occur in
these situations. Therefore, this debate will likely continue until the
Supreme Court settles the matter.
27. Id. at 21. Two years later in TXO Prod Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., the Supreme Court
again upheld a jury's award of punitive damages. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia wrote
that that since the jury's award of punitive damages was reviewed by both the trial court and Court
of Appeals, the "'procedural due process' require[ment of] judicial review of punitive damages
awards for reasonableness" was satisfied. TXO Prod Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
471 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. MedVaIUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc., 2003 WL 21322298, at *4 n.5
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 22, 2003).
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1. Judicial Review of Arbitration: An Overview
Over the last fifty years, arbitration has increasingly become the
prevalent form of alternate dispute resolution.29 This is due to the
attractiveness arbitration has to parties who realize that they can obtain a
quick resolution without incurring the costs, delays and publicity that are
intrinsic to litigation.3° Participants are able to choose the arbitrator(s) and
decide which procedural rules will apply to the proceeding.3I However, this
convenience comes at a price: not only do arbitrants sacrifice their statutory
and common law procedural and evidentiary rights,32 but courts (pursuant to
the FAA) will treat an arbitral award as a final judgment.3 3  Courts and
commentators alike have long agreed that had this finality not existed,
arbitration would become a prelude to litigation instead of a substitute.34 It
is for this reason that, under the FAA, judicial review of an arbitration award
is narrowly limited and a court reviewing an award must use an exceedingly
deferential standard.35 As one court has explained, the FAA "does not allow
29. Bradley T. Kling, "'Through Fault of Their Own " - Applying Bonner Mall's Extraordinary
Circumstances Test to Heightened Standard of Review Clauses, 45 B.C. L. REv. 943, 944-45 (2004).
30. Id. at 945. However, the growing popularity of arbitration has led at least one court to
lament that "[i]n the final analysis, arbitration amounts to the privatization of our judicial system."
Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In Re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
31. LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:01 (3d ed. 2003).
32. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
33. The concept of an arbitration award being the equivalent to a final judgment pre-dates the
FAA by more than a century. In the 1817 case, Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, the New York Court of
Chancery explained that:
If every award must be made conformable to what would have been the judgment of [the]
Court in the case, it would render arbitrations useless and vexatious, and a source of great
litigation; for it very rarely happens that both parties are satisfied. The decision by
arbitration is the decision of a tribunal of the parties' own choice and election. It is a
popular, cheap, convenient, and domestic mode of trial, which the courts have always
regarded with liberal indulgence; they have never exacted from these unlettered tribunals,
this rusticum forum, the observance of technical rule and formality. They have only
looked to see if the proceedings were honestly and fairly conducted, and if that appeared to
be the case, they have uniformly and universally refused to interfere with the judgment of
the arbitrators.
Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns Ch. 339, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 400 (1817).
34. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854) (stating that if an arbitral award was not a final
judgment then the award would be "the commencement, not the end, of litigation."); see also Office
of Supply, Republic of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that
the limited review of arbitration awards maintains the viability of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation); EDMONSON, supra note 31, at § 39:1 (stating that the key to effectuating the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration "is by limiting judicial review of arbitration awards.").
35. See Davis v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United
Paperworks Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F.
Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Tex. 1997); ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.
1995).
234
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courts to 'roam unbridled' in their oversight of arbitration awards, but
carefully limits judicial intervention to instances where the arbitration has
been tainted in specified ways."' 36 In fact, even clear "factual or legal errors
by [an arbitrator] ... 'do not authorize courts to annul awards"' 37 without
some form of misconduct3 8 pertaining to the proceedings by the arbitrator or
the parties. 39 The rationale behind this strict standard of review is the idea
that the parties, in their desire to experience the expediency of arbitration,
have agreed to a quasi-quid pro quo: in exchange for the simplicity of
arbitration, they have given up the procedures and opportunity for review
that would have been available in a court proceeding. n Because of this, the
FAA does not allow the courts to have complete de novo review of the
arbitral result.41 Indeed, in an effort to further effectuate the public policy in
favor of the enforcement of arbitral awards, § 10(a) of the FAA provides only
four grounds for a court to vacate an arbitration award:
42
36. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 870 (1992).
37. Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Widell v. Wolf, 43
F.3d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir. 1994)).
38. The Eighth Circuit has explained that "'[b]eyond the grounds for vacation provided in the
FAA, an award will only be set aside where it is completely irrational or evidences a manifest
disregard for the law."' Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Val-U
Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998)). Furthermore, "an
arbitration decision only manifests disregard for the law where the arbitrators clearly identify the
applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it." Id. at 462 (citing Stroh Container Co. v.
Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1986)).
39. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 683. See also Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Commc'n Int'l
Union, Local IB, 284 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the award will be confirmed even if
the arbitrator did commit a serious error, so "long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority .... ); Antwine v. Prudential
Bache Secs., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990).
40. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
But see John G. Poles et al., New York Arbitration at the Millennium: The Dynamism of a Flexible
Forum, NAFTIKA CHRONIKA (June 1999), available at http://www.smany.org/sma/ArbitratApril
2000.html (stating an alternative theory that "courts tend not to disturb awards, because they like to
see that alternative legal forums are viable in order to relieve the growing pressures on the court
system.").
41. Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Arbitration
does not provide a system of 'junior varsity trial courts' offering the losing party complete and
rigorous de novo review .... A restrictive standard of review is necessary to preserve these benefits
and to prevent arbitration from becoming a 'preliminary step to judicial resolution."').
42. See also EDMONSON, supra note 31, at § 39:01 ("The public policy underlying the Act is
intended to give effect to the arbitration agreement of the parties by limiting the grounds on which to
secure judicial vacatur of objectionable arbitration awards.").
7
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(1) Where the award was produced by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.4 3
For the most part, these grounds for vacating an award involve instances
of bias or procedural unfairness. In fact, only the provision involving an
arbitrator exceeding his or her powers seems to possibly involve errors of
substantive law." However, that provision "has been narrowly construed to
apply only when arbitrators decide issues not presented to them or grant
relief not authorized in the arbitration agreement. 'A5  It should therefore
come as no surprise that the vast majority of arbitration awards are easily
confirmed.46 Although the quick confirmation of an arbitration award, even
when the proceedings involved obvious errors, is nothing new, 47 the
occasional harsh result has become an increasing concern as arbitration
continues to become more commonplace.48
The parties at the short end of excessive awards find themselves in an
unfortunate predicament. Since arbitration is a form of private contract, the
constitutional protections regularly found in a court proceeding are not
43. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2005). However, parties may opt out of the FAA's strict vacatur
standards and adopt some review standards under a state law. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 289 (3d Cir. 2001). Section 11 of the FAA similarly allows modification of
an arbitrator's award only in limited instances. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2005).
44. EDMONSON, supra note 31, at § 39:2.
45. Id.
46. As one commentator has succinctly written, "If there is but one realistic, post-award
probability, it is - think confirmation." THOMAS H. OEHMKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 133:1 (3d ed. 2004). But see Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996) ("courts
are neither entitled nor encouraged simply to 'rubber stamp' the interpretations and decisions of
arbitrators.").
47. Soon after the birth of this nation, the Supreme Court explained that the confirmation of an
arbitrator's award is necessary in order to give the judgment validity. See Williams v. Craig, 1 U.S.
313, 314-15 (July Term, 1788) ("since the Revolution ... the approbation of the Court is made a
necessary ingredient in the confirmation of reports ....").
48. See In re Knepp, 229 B.R. at 828. (stating that "[a]rbitration was innocuous when limited
to negotiated commercial contracts, but it developed sinister characteristics when it became
ubiquitous."); But cf Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751 ("Although this result may seem
draconian, the rules of law limiting judicial review and the judicial process in the arbitration context
are well established and the parties ... can be presumed to have been well versed in the
consequences of their decision to resolve their disputes in this manner.").
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applicable.4 9 Still, it can be argued that if the arbitration was somehow
transformed from a private agreement into a state action, then constitutional
protections would certainly apply.
2. Due Process & The State Action Doctrine
a. Shelley v. Kraemer
The state action doctrine maintains that the protections of individual
rights and liberties afforded by the Constitution apply only to governmental
action.50 The importance of this doctrine cannot be understated, for "it
assures the maintenance of the public/private dichotomy that lies at the very
heart of liberal democratic theory.",51  Courts must be wary of extending
constitutional restraints designed to limit governmental power to private
actors, while simultaneously making sure that private actors who are acting
on behalf of the state do not infringe upon the rights of others. By
maintaining this dichotomy, both individual liberty and state sovereignty are
protected.53  Although the importance of enforcing the state action doctrine
is apparent, determining when state action truly exists is not so clear.
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, the Supreme
Court established a test to determine whether the state action requisite to a
due process claim has been met:
In the typical case raising a state-action issue, a private party has taken the decisive step
that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question is whether the State was sufficiently
involved to treat that decisive conduct as state action. This may occur if the State creates
the legal framework governing the conduct ... if it delegates its authority to the private
actor.., or sometimes if it knowingly accepts the benefit derived from unconstitutional
49. See, e.g., Elmore v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[T]he fact that a private arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that are encompassed by the
term 'due process of law' cannot give rise to a constitutional complaint.").
50. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991). The text of the
Constitution itself is the source for limiting its application to only the government. For example, the
First Amendment states that "Congress" shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or the press.
In fact, with the exception of "the Thirteenth Amendment, none of the Constitution's provisions are
directed at private actors." ERWIN CHEMERNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 6.4.2 (1997).
51. Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L.
REV. 1145, 1163 (Summer 2004).
52. See id at 1164.
53. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, RETHINKING STATE ACTION, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 535-36
(Fall 1985).
237
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behavior. Thus, in the usual case we ask whether the State provided a mantle of authority
that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor. 
54
Applying this test in one form or another, courts have consistently held
that no state action can be found when parties voluntarily contract to
arbitrate their claims.55 The use of the arbitration forum is "intended to
provide a simple, final dispute resolution mechanism," which would be
independent "of compulsory reliance on either procedural or substantive law
imposed by statutes and judicial interpretations., 56  Constitutional
restrictions intended to protect private actors from governmental intrusions
are therefore inapplicable. However, situations may arise where a private
action, such as an arbitration proceeding, is transformed into a state action
via the actions of a court.5 7 Quite possibly the most famous illustration of a
private contract being transformed into a state action due to a court's
enforcement occurred in Shelley v. Kraemer."5
Shelley involved an African-American family who purchased a parcel of
land which, unbeknownst to them, was subject to a restrictive covenant that
permitted only whites to purchase the property. 9 The owners of other
parcels of land subject to the same restrictive agreement brought suit to
enforce the covenant and divest Shelley of the property.60 The trial court
denied the requested relief stating that the restrictive covenant had never
been finalized since the parties to the agreement had intended that all
property owners in the district sign the agreement, and all signatures had
never been obtained. 61  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding
that the agreement was effective and did not violate any rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.62 Shelley then petitioned the United States Supreme Court,
54. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
55. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 940 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that
arbitration is a private, voluntary proceeding that does not constitute state action); Davis v.
Prudential Sec. Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (1 lth Cir. 1995); Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (arbitration is a "private proceeding, arranged by contract,
without legal compulsion.").
56. Ritkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
57. It has been explained, and with good reason, that the cases which deal with these
exceptions are a "conceptual disaster area." Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword.- "State Action, " Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
58. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
59. Id. at 4. The restrictive covenant stated that the property shall not be "occupied by any
person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said property ...
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other
purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race." Id. at 10.
60. Id. at6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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arguing that the judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him equal protection of the laws,
depriving him of property without due process, and depriving him of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.63
Chief Justice Vinson began his opinion by explaining that "the principle
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law" that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process protection only applies to actions of the State and
does not govern private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or
wrongful. 64 The Court therefore concluded that the restrictive covenant
alone could not be regarded as violating petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment
rights.65
The Court then addressed whether judicial enforcement of the covenant
transformed an otherwise private agreement into a state action.66 Justice
Vinson explained that "the action of state courts and of judicial officers in
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long
been established by decisions of this Court., 67  If not for the active
intervention of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Shelley would have been
free to occupy the property. Therefore, the Court held that by the lower
court's enforcement of the restrictive agreement, the State violated Shelley's
rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.61
Although it is generally accepted that judges are state actors, Shelley is a
controversial decision given that it can now be argued that any decision by a
state court regarding a private action can transform the private action into a
state action. Possibly with this in mind, courts have rarely used Shelley as a
basis for finding state action. 69 Nevertheless, in the years following its
decision in Shelley, the Supreme Court has found the existence of state
action in several cases where judges have exercised their statutory or
common law powers in what would otherwise have been actions by private
63. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 7-8.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 20.
69. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4.4.3 (1997)
(explaining that "[tihe Court, of course, never has taken Shelley this far, but nor has it articulated any
clear limiting principles.").
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parties where the restrictions of the Constitution would not apply. One such
case is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.7 °
New York Times involved a libel suit brought by an elected official in
Montgomery, Alabama against The New York Times and four African-
American clergymen for an advertisement that had been published in the
newspaper criticizing the way the Montgomery police had treated civil rights
demonstrators.7' It was admitted that the ad contained several false
statements: that the demonstrators sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" when
they had actually sung the Star Spangled Banner; that nine students were
expelled for attending the demonstration when their suspension was really
due to a separate protest at a lunch counter; that the campus dinning hall had
been padlocked; that Dr. Martin Luther King had been arrested seven times
when he had actually been arrested four.72 The trial court submitted the case
to the jury and instructed them that since the statements were libelous per se,
the state law assumed legal injury from the mere publication of the ad and
malice was to be presumed.73 The judge rejected the petitioners' contention
that his ruling violated "the freedoms of speech and press that are guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendment," 74 curtly stating that "[t]he First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications"
and "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not
private action."7
5
The Court disagreed and in finding state action, explained that although
the case was a civil suit between private parties, the Alabama courts had
applied a state law which the petitioners claimed imposed an invalid
restriction on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. 76 "It matters
not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law
only .... The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. 7
Similarly, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. the Supreme Court found the
existence of state action when the clerk of the state court issued a writ of
attachment which was executed by the County Sheriff.7 8 At issue in Lugar
was the Virginia statute which allowed the prejudgment attachment of the
petitioner's property as long as the respondent alleged, in an ex parte
70. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 258-59.
73. Id. at 262.
74. Id. at 262-63.
75. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
76. Id. at 285.
77. Id.
78. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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petition, that he believed that the petitioner might dispose of his property in
order to defeat his creditors. 79 Thirty-four days after the attachment, a state
trial judge ordered the attachment dismissed because the respondent had
failed to establish the statutory grounds for the attachment that he had
alleged in his petition.80 Petitioner then brought suit alleging that by
attaching his property, respondents had acted together with the state in
depriving him of his property without due process of law.81 The district
court held that the respondent's actions did not constitute state action as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.8 ' The petitioner then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which reversed, holding that all that is required to find state
action is the "invoking [of] the aid of state officials to take advantage of
state-created attachment procedures. 83  The Court, therefore, found the
Clerk's issuance of the writ of attachment to be a form of state action and
remanded the case for further proceedings.84
The holdings of Shelley, New York Times, and Lugar clearly
demonstrate how private action, as innocent-looking as restrictive covenants
or attachments, can be transformed into state action upon the aid of state
officials. Based upon this line of reasoning, the question arises whether an
award in private arbitration, when confirmed by a court, is transformed into
a state action and therefore requires adherence to due process requirements.85
b. Confirmation: The Argument Against State Action
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the confirmation of an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages in a decision that would become the
foundation for future anti-state action arguments.86 In Davis v. Prudential
Securities, Inc., the district court had confirmed an award to an investor by
79. Id. at 924.
80. Id. at 925.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
84. Id.
85. The purpose of an action for confirmation is to transform the arbitral award into a
judgment which can then be judicially enforced as if it were an ordinary civil judgment. THOMAS H.
OEHMKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1331:1 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that "[t]he reality in
most cases is that the default standard is to confirm an award, while vacatur is the rare exception.").
86. See Davis v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 59 F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 1995).
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the American Arbitration Association of $483,684 in compensatory damages
and $300,000 in punitive damages against Prudential Securities.87
Prudential appealed, arguing that the award of punitive damages was
unconstitutional "because arbitration lacks the procedural protections and
meaningful judicial review required for the imposition of punitive
damages. 88 Not surprisingly, the court rejected the argument, explaining
that arbitration was a private agreement entered into voluntarily via
contractual agreement and therefore lacked the "state action element of a due
process claim ..."89
Prudential, "apparently relying on a Shelley v. Kraemer theory," further
argued that the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award
constitutes state action.90 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating that the
holding of Shelley had "not been extended beyond the context of race
discrimination" and therefore did not apply to the confirmation of an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages. 9' As the court explained, "[t]o
decide otherwise would constitutionalize private arbitration proceedings and
diminish both the effectiveness and the appeal of the arbitral forum as an
alternative means for resolving disputes. 92 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's confirmation of punitive damages.93
The principle that Shelley should not be extended beyond cases
involving racial discrimination is not unique to the holding in Davis, and in
fact was explicitly stated by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Bell v.
Maryland.94 Bell involved the arrest and conviction of nine African-
American students for trespass due to their participation in a sit-in at a
Maryland restaurant that refused to serve black customers. The Court
remanded the case to state court because of the then-recent passage of new
city and state public accommodation laws that addressed the issue.
However, Justice Black viewed Bell as an opportunity to clarify the limits of
the Shelly doctrine and therefore explained in his dissenting opinion that:
It seems pretty clear that the reason judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants in
[Shelley] was deemed state action was not merely the fact that a state court had acted, but
rather that it had acted 'to deny petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment
87. Id. at 1187-88.
88. Id. at 1190.
89. Id. at 1191.
90. Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1193-94.
93. Id. at 1196.
94. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
242
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol6/iss2/2
[Vol. 6: 2, 2006]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire
and which the grantors are willing to sell.'
95
As Justice Black explained, in Shelly both the seller and the buyer
wanted to complete the transaction and it was the Court's enforcement of the
restrictive covenant which prevented them from doing so.96 Conversely,
although the students in Bell wanted to be in the restaurant, the owner didn't
want the protest occurring on his property.97 Therefore the "mere judicial
enforcement of the trespass law is not sufficient" to convert what had
occurred into a state action.98 If this limitation was not so, then state action
would occur whenever an owner of private property, such as a bar or
supermarket, enlists the help of law enforcement to prosecute a trespasser
who entered the property in order to make a speech to the customers
regarding his personal political beliefs.99
The decision in Davis has been cited in numerous decisions which hold
that no state action is found when a court confirms an arbitrator's award of
punitive damages. 00 For instance, in Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., an
arbitration panel by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
had awarded the plaintiff punitive damages against his former employer due
to the employer's "reprehensible conduct in orchestrating a campaign of
deception that included giving the impression that [plaintiff] had mishandled
95. Id. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 330-31.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 332.
99. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has recently explained that:
At first glance, judicial confirmation of an arbitration award fits the Shelley pattern
perfectly. Judicial confirmation is indisputably an exercise of government authority.
Furthermore, just as with the restrictive covenant in Shelley, the arbitration award at issue
in the present case would have had no effect without the active intervention of the courts,
"supported by the full panoply of state power .. " Therefore, the same "but for"
reasoning that guided the analysis of the Supreme Court in Shelley would seem to compel
the conclusion that the judicial confirmation of an arbitration award constitutes state
action. Shelley's precedential authority for this proposition, however, at least outside the
context of racially restrictive covenants, is at best questionable. Although praised as a
landmark civil rights decision, Shelley has also been the subject of much controversy and
criticism. Indeed, many commentators speculate that the holding of Shelley has been
effectively confined to its facts.
MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 430-31 (Sup. Ct. Conn.
2005).
100. E.g., Daniels v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., No. 00-7225-CIV-ZLOCH, 2002 WL
31938885, *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2002).
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his clients' investments, was untrustworthy, was not authorized to do
business and, in some way, had been involved in the embezzlement of
clients' funds."' '  The Supreme Court of New York County reduced the
award and confirmed it as modified.10 2 Upon appeal, the appellate court
cited Davis and held that "there is ample authority for the proposition that a
private arbitration does not implicate due process concerns since, where the
parties have voluntarily participated in the arbitration process, there is no
state action involved, not even in the judicial confirmation of the punitive
damages award."'0 3
Lastly, there is the train of thought that by voluntarily entering into an
arbitration proceeding, a party waives the right to claim due process
violations altogether. The Supreme Court has explained that the "due
process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to a
waiver."' 4 This concept has been applied in at least one case involving a
claim of due process violation arising out of the limited judicial review of an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages. In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline
Company, a landowner brought an action against the owner of an oil pipeline
to recover damages to his property arising from a leak in the pipeline.'0 5 The
panel of three arbitrators ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the district court
confirmed the arbitration. 10 6 The defendant appealed the decision, arguing
in part that the limited judicial review of punitive damages awarded by the
arbitrator violates the Constitution's due process protections. 0 7 The Tenth
Circuit responded that since the defendant had voluntarily entered into
arbitration, had petitioned the district court to compel arbitration, and had
agreed to be governed by the broad language in the arbitration rules allowing
"any remedy or relief," he may not now "oppose the very process [he]
advocated and to which [he] voluntarily submitted .... [He] is essentially
101. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
102. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
103. Id. at 271 (citations omitted). See also Memberworks, 872 A.2d at 428-29 ("We conclude
that, because an arbitration award does not constitute state action and is not converted into state
action by the trial court's confirmation of that award, an arbitration panel's award of punitive
damages does not implicate the due process clause, regardless of how excessive the award may
be."); But cf Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 1994 WL 757709, *13-14 (M.D. Tenn. 1994)
(the question of whether judicial confirmation constitutes state action is moot because a court will
only confirm if it finds that the arbitrator's award does not violate constitutional rights).
104. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972).
105. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 2001).
106. Id. at 930.
107. Id. at 939.
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foreclosed from arguing a due process violation ... .108 Therefore, it may
be argued that even if there was a requirement of due process protection in
the award of punitive damages, the parties waive such protection when they
enter into an arbitration agreement.
c. Confirmation: The Argument In Favor of State Action
Although the fear of "constitutionalizing" private arbitration
proceedings is a valid concern, the principle set forth in Davis, that a court's
confirmation of a punitive award does not constitute state action, is not
universally accepted. Regarding the award of punitive damages in
arbitration, in remains true that:
[W]e have almost none of the protections that fundamental fairness and due process
require for the imposition of this sort of punishment. Discovery is abbreviated if available
at all. The rules of evidence are employed, if at all, in a very relaxed manner. The
factfinders (here the panel) operate with almost [no] ... controls and safeguards .... "10
Furthermore, a logical extension of the plain reading of Shelley, New
York Times, and Lugar would appear to be that a court's confirmation of an
arbitration award of punitive damages constitutes a clear case of state action.
Numerous courts have therefore grappled with the task of reconciling the
108. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 940. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Todd Shipyards Corp v. Cunard
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991) held that by agreeing to arbitrate, the defendant waived any
potential due process challenge regarding the award of punitive damages by the arbitrators.
109. There is a problem with this line of thinking, as explained by Stephen J. Ware in his
article, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment and
Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 569 (Nov. 1994). If contract law does
indeed govern, then whether an arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of due process must be
decided on a case-by-case basis and classic contract defenses such as fraud and duress would apply.
Furthermore:
It is ... important to note that unless a given arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of
due process rights, it is unenforceable under non-constitutional law. That is because
Section 2 of the FAA only "make[s] arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but no more so." Either an arbitration agreement constitutes a valid waiver of
due process or the Due Process Clauses are superfluous because the arbitration agreement
is unenforceable anyway.
Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in
Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 569 (Nov. 1994)
(quoting Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
110. Davis, 59 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 889 (8th Cir. 1993) (Beam, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993).
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holding of Davis with the fact that Shelley and its progeny seem to dictate
that state action does indeed exist in these scenarios.
For instance, Commonwealth Associates v. Letsos involved an arbitrator
awarding a customer actual and punitive damages against his former stock
brokerage firm due to the firm's unauthorized purchases in the plaintiffs
account and its failure to execute the plaintiffs sell orders resulting in over
$100,000 in damages."' The firm moved to vacate the award arguing in part
that the award of punitive damages violated the Due Process Clause due to
the limited scope of judicial review of punitive damages awarded by an
arbitrator.' 2 The court rejected the firm's argument explaining that by its
insistence that customer disputes be resolved by arbitration, the firm
inherently accepted any limitations there may be concerning the judicial
review of awards rendered in the arbitral forum."3 However, the opinion
went on to state that:
[w]hile the Court does not reach the issue, the Court respectfully doubts that the rationale
for this result set forth in Davis v. Prudential ... that an arbitration award involves no state
action-is well founded. While the procedures utilized in private arbitration do not
constitute state action, the application of the coercive power of a court to confirm and
enforce an arbitration award is arguably another matter.'
14
This reservation over the holding of Davis was likewise expressed by
the bankruptcy court in Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp (In re Knepp)."5
In re Knepp involved a debtor who filed a complaint against several
creditors who sold, financed, and provided a service contract for an
automobile he had purchased. 16 He sought to determine the validity and
extent of a lien and alleged that the defendants had engaged in fraud and
civil conspiracy.' 17 Defendants sought to stay the proceeding and to enforce
an arbitration clause contained in the debtor's contract which he had signed
when he purchased the vehicle." 8 In response, the plaintiff argued that the
arbitration clause violated due process since it limited or eliminated his
ability to conduct extensive discovery." 9 The court disagreed and stated that
arbitration is a form of private conduct and quoted Davis, saying that "the
[state] action element of a due process claim is absent in private arbitration
11I. Commonwealth Assocs. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
112. Id. at 177.
113. Id.
114. Id. at n.37 (citations omitted).
115. InreKnepp, 229 B.R. at 821.
116. Id. at 831-32.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 840.
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cases.' 120 Yet, the court continued to quote multiple commentators who
disagreed with the holding of Davis. These commentators believed that
contractually compelled arbitrations, as well as the confirmation of
arbitration awards, constitute state action pursuant to Lugar v. Edmonson.121
One such commentary discussed by the court was an article written by Jean
R. Stemlight which explained that state action existed because Congress, by
enacting the FAA "'restrict[ed] parties' access to litigation or other forums
no less than if Congress had enacted a statute requiring private parties to
take disputes to arbitration."' 12' These articles persuasively argued the
existence of state action and led the court to bemoan that it "believes the
scholarly articles correctly address this issue. However, this Court is bound
by the precedent in the Eleventh Circuit as stated in Davis and finds that the
Due Process rights of the Plaintiff have not been denied." '123
It appears that this is a quandary which numerous courts continue to find
themselves in, attempting to balance their belief that confirming an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages is a clear example of state action,
against the Davis decision in which the Eleventh Circuit held that state
action did not exist in these types of cases.124 However, even if the Davis
120. Id. (quoting Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
121. The court cited, among other commentators, Professor Richard Reuben who maintained
that:
the Supreme Court's state action decisions "seem to compel an understanding that, for
constitutional purposes, ADR (i.e. arbitration) hearings can constitute state action when
they are court-related or contractually enforced." Utilizing the framework established by
the Supreme Court in Lugar... he concludes that contractually compelled arbitration can
be state action for constitutional purposes.
In re Knepp, 229 B.R. at 840-41 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 841 (quoting Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1997)).
123. Id. at 841 (citing Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191).
124. An example of how courts have been forced to invent imaginative solutions in order to
find state action while still applying the Davis holding is Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So.2d
27 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 2004). That case involved a suit by several newspaper dealers against the
Birmingham News Company, alleging that the company had wrongfully and illegally terminated
their contracts. Id. at 30. The plaintiffs originally brought their claims in Jefferson Circuit Court,
and the defendant moved to compel arbitration of the claims as provided for in the arbitration
provisions in their agreements. Id. The trial court ordered the claims to arbitration and the Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed. The arbitrator issued an award for the plaintiff, including punitive
damages, which was quickly confirmed. The defendant appealed, claiming that its due process
protections had been violated. Id. at 66. In what can only be described as "a stretch," the Supreme
Court of Alabama distinguished Davis and found that the confirmation of the arbitration award did
indeed constitute state action requiring the protection of the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.
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decision were to be ignored and the existence of state action deemed to exist
when an arbitrator's award of punitive damages is confirmed, it is not a
certainty that this would cause a party's due process rights to be violated.
The year before Davis was decided, a California appeals court was
presented with a case in which the appellant argued that due process
protections, such as the requirement for judicial review, must apply in
situations where there is a punitive award assessed by an arbitrator.125 The
1994 case Rflcind & Sterling, Inc. v. Ricind involved the arbitration of a
dispute between a law firm and a former partner at the firm in which the law
firm was awarded punitive damages and attorney's fees. 12 6 The award was
confirmed by the Superior Court and the former partner appealed, arguing
that both the award of attorney's fees and punitive damages were
improper. 127  The court began its opinion by stating that even if the due
process right of judicial review is required, the appellant had waived this
right by entering into the agreement, which specified that all arguments
would be decided informally by arbitration and that the arbitrator's award
would be "final, conclusive, and binding."'128 Nevertheless, the court went
on to discuss whether due process requires the judicial review of private
arbitral awards of punitive damages. 129
The Court began by explaining how the Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution only apply when there is state action and that the arbitration at
issue "was a private proceeding, arranged by contract, without any legal
compulsion."'13° Furthermore, by contending that the confirmation of an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages requires judicial review, the appellant
The court explained that unlike Davis where the action began in an arbitration hearing, in the instant
case the plaintiff's action began in a court proceeding and the parties were ordered by the court to go
to arbitration. Birmingham News Co., 901 So.2d 27 at 66. The court further explained that "but for
the court action, there would have been no arbitration at all .. . . Id. Accordingly, we readily
perceive the requisite state action underlying these appeals sufficient to justify our review of the
awards under governing federal due-process considerations .. " Id.
125. Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (2d Dist. 1994).
126. Id. at 829-30.
127. Id. at 830-31. The court described the appellant's argument as follows:
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the due process clause requires some
measure of judicial review of the size of and basis for a punitive damage award. However,
in California no such review of a private arbitrator's award is available. Hence, such an
award for punitive damages cannot lawfully be made, unless the defendant expressly
waives the right to judicial review of it. Because [appellant] did not make such a waiver,
in the agreement or otherwise, the arbitrator was not empowered to award punitive
damages against him.
Ritkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
128. Id. at833.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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was ignoring the fact that an arbitration award is not a product of public law
or state proceedings, but rather is a private arrangement that is governed by
rules agreed upon by the parties.1"' Nonetheless, the court surprisingly
agreed that a proceeding which confirmed an arbitration award and
converted it into a judicial judgment did in fact constitute state action but
perhaps not enough state action to require due process protection. 3 2 The
court explained:
Only a limited degree of state action is involved in confirming an arbitration award. The
state does not impose the award, or mark out its criteria. It only allows the contracting
contestants to secure enforcement of their own bargain. That assertion of state power does
require a traditional measure of due process. But to our knowledge, neither constitutional
authority nor due process tradition has ever required, in this setting, the type of judicial
review here contended for."'
It would therefore appear that even if the holding of Davis is
disregarded, and the confirmation of an arbitrator's award of punitive
damages is held to be a form of state action, that limited form of state action
would not be enough to require due process protection.
Lastly, even with the holding of Davis, there is an argument that the
Eleventh Circuit may have arrived at a different conclusion had the
arbitrator's award of punitive damages been based upon the requirements of
a statute. 13 4 This is because statutory punitive damages are established by
the state for the public's benefit by punishing bad acts with the hope to
encourage appropriate behavior in the future. 35 Under this line of thinking,
an arbitrator's mere award of punitive damages based upon a statute would
constitute state action since, by handing out a punishment in the hope to
promote proper behavior, it would be carrying out a task that has
traditionally been done exclusively by the government. 36  This novel
argument does not appear to have been raised in any recorded decision, and
131. Id.
132. Id. at 833.
133. Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
134. See Edward Wood Dunham, Are There Due Process Limits on Arbitral Punitive Damage
Awards, 23 A.B.A. FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 4 (Summer 2003).
135. In BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, explained
that "punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." See also EDMONSON, supra note 31 at § 38:9
("Generally, punitive damages are awarded in arbitration to compensatory damages for the benefit of
society in order to punish a party and to serve as an example to deter others from committing similar
offenses in the future.").
136. See Dunham, supra note 134, at 4.
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it therefore remains unknown how a court would address it. However, it can
be assumed that even if a court agreed that an arbitrator's award of statutory
punitive damages did involve state action, the award would only involve
limited state action and therefore, as explained in Rijfkind & Sterling, would
not require due process protections. 137
CONCLUSION
It is well established that the due process safeguards which are found in
judicial proceedings are, for the most part, absent from arbitration. 138 The
reason for this is that constitutional protections do not extend to "private
conduct abridging individual rights" such as arbitration. 3 9 This is true even
if the arbitration award contains punitive damages, regardless of the fact that
the "United States Supreme Court has ruled that the due process clause
requires some measure of judicial review of the size of and basis for a
punitive damages award.' 40 However, the question has arisen as to whether
a court's confirmation of an arbitration' award of punitive damages would
constitute state action, by which, similar to the situation in Shelley v.
Kraemer, due process protections would apply.
The foremost decision on this issue is the 1995 case Davis v. Prudential
Securities, Inc. In Davis the Eleventh Circuit held that the confirmation of
an arbitrator's award of punitive damages did not involve state action and
that due process protection therefore did not apply. 14' Although Davis is the
leading case on this topic, numerous commentators have taken issue with the
Eleventh Circuit's conclusion. 42 Furthermore, several courts have likewise
stated their disapproval with the Davis holding but have found themselves
bound by the precedent which is sets. 143 This has led to much confusion and
has recently caused at least one practitioner to protest that "this chaos in the
lower courts cries out for Supreme Court review."' 44 However, until the
Supreme Court does decide to address this issue, it would appear that courts
must continue to follow the holding of Davis, and the victims of arbiters'
137. See Ritfkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832-34.
138. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 191.
139. Id. at 192 (citation omitted).
140. Rijkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831. This is what the appellant unsuccessfully argued.
141. Davis, 59 F.3dat 1195-96.
142. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
143. See, e.g., In re Knepp, 229 B.R. at 841.
144. See supra note 15 (Amici Curiae Brief in EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Stark).
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punitive awards gone awry must find solace in the knowledge that although
their argument for due process protection may not succeed, there are many
who feel it should.
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